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Abstract 
!e Sanskrit word, darśana, is generally translated into English as philosophy, but it is admittedly inadequate. !e so-
called six (āstika, a$rmativist or orthodox) systems of philosophy have been described by Louis Renou as ‘philosophico-
religious,’ since religion and philosophy cannot be separated in their tradition. On the other hand, Maurice Winternitz 
brands some of the six (such as Mīmāᒢsā and Vedānta) as religion and some others (such as, Nyāya and Vaiśeᒲika) as 
philosophy. A.K. Warder claims that, despite everything, religion and philosophy can be separated quite adequately, 
and the darśanas are all philosophies. All this however leaves the so-called six (nāstika, negativist or heterodox) systems, 
particularly the materialist systems out of consideration. While the Jain and the Buddhist systems do have religious 
associations, the pre-Cārvāka and the Cārvāka materialist systems remained thoroughly philosophical, untouched 
by any religion. !e orthodox systems, mostly in their syncretic forms, became religio-philosophical (although some 
of them might have originated as philosophy) while the materialist systems retained their original secular character.
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Resumen 
La palabra sanscrita darśana se traduce generalmente en inglés como &losofía, pero esto es inadecuado. Los llamados 
seis sistemas āstika (a&rmativista u ortodoxa) de la &losofía han sido descritos por Louis Renou como “&losó&co-
religiosos,” ya que la &losofía y la religión no pueden separarse en sus tradiciones. Por otro lado, Maurice Winternitz 
cali&ca algunos de los seis (tales como Mīmāᒢsā y Vedānta) como religión y otros (tales como Nyāya y Vaiśeᒲika) 
como &losofía. A.K. Warder asegura que, a pesar de todo, la religión y la &losofía se pueden separar de una manera 
adecuada, y que los darśanas son todos corrientes &losó&cas. Sin embargo, todo esto deja los llamados seis sistemas 
nāstika (negativista o heterodoxa), en particular los sistemas materialistas, fuera de consideración. Mientras los sistemas 
jainistas y budistas tienen asociaciones religiosas, los sistemas materialistas pre-Cārvāka y Cārvāka se mantuvieron 
&losó&cos, sin ser tocados por ninguna religión. Los sistemas ortodoxos, sobre todo en su forma sincrética, se con-
virtieron en religio-&losó&cos (aunque algunos de ellos pudieron haber originado como &losofía) mientras que los 
sistemas materialistas mantuvieron su carácter secular original.
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Resumo
A palavra sanscrita darśana traduz geralmente em ingles como &losofía, mas esto não é inadequado. Os chamados seis 
sistemas (āstika, a&rmativista ou ortodoxa) da &losofía han sido descrividos por Louis Renou como “&losó&co-relgioso”, 
já que a &losofía e a religião não podem ser separados de suas tradições. Por outro lado, Maurice Winternitz quali&ca 
algums dos seis (tais como Mīmāᒢsā y Vedānta) como religião e outros (tais como Nyāya y Vaiśeᒲika) como &losofía. 
A.K. Warder assegura que a pesar de todo, a religião e a &losofía se podem separar de uma manera adecuada, e que as 
darśanas são todas &losofías. Apesar disso, todo esto deixa os chamados seis sistemas (nāstika, negativista ou heterodoxo), 
em particular os sistemas materialistas fora de consideração. Enquanto os sistemas Jain e Budistas têm associações 
religiosas, os sistemas materialistas pre- Cārvāka e Cārvāka se mantiveram &losó&cos, sin ser tocados por nenhuma 
religião. Os sitemas ortodoxos, em maioria em sua forma sincrética, se mudaron en religió-&loso&cos (embora algums 
de eles poderiam ter fonte como &losofía) enquanto os sistemas materialistas mantiveram seu carácter secular original.
Palavras-chave: Darśana, materialismo, religião, seis sistemas de &loso&a
Three Views of Darsana
!e darśanas in India, Louis Renou said, were ‘philo-
sophico-religious systems’ and more elaborately speaking, 
‘the generic name of the great area of the philosophical and 
religious speculation of ancient India’ (qtd. Gerschheimer, 
2000-2001, p.173). Here and elsewhere, by darśana only 
those six systems are meant that admit the Veda as an 
instrument of cognition. Not only materialism but also 
Jainism and Buddhism are excluded from this category. 
M(materialism is generally called the Cārvāka or Lokāyata 
system, but we shall see that by the early centuries of 
the Common Era more than one materialist school had 
already come into being in ancient India. Hence I opt for 
the use of the umbrella term, materialism. (Gerschheimer 
too elected this general appellation/designation rather 
than speci&c names of all the systems. See Gerschheimer, 
2000-2001, pp. 179-188; 2007, p. 239 n4). However, 
&ve other systems, the four schools of Buddhism and the 
Jain school, can also be called ‘philosophico-religious’. 
Some other minor systems, mentioned in doxographi-
cal works like the Sarva-darśana-saᒣgraha (SDS), such 
as the Pūrᒤa-prajña (ch.5), Nakulᚹśa-Pāśupata (ch.6), 
Pratyabhijñā (ch.8), and even Raseśvara (ch.9) systems 
too have religious or cultic associations. Only the Pāᒤini 
system mentioned in the SDS (ch.13) may be excluded 
from this category of both philosophy and religion, for 
it is concerned with grammar alone.
Maurice Winternitz, however, claimed that at least 
some of the philosophical systems, such as Nyāya and 
Vaiśeᒲika, were non-religious in origin but admitted that 
some others, such as Advaita Vedānta and Yoga, were ab 
initio connected with religious sects. (Winternitz, 1985, 
3:523-524, 533, 558, 566). He even goes to the extent 
of claiming: “!e Vaiśeᒲika system, that tries to explain 
nature independently of religious belief in its character 
does not appear to be widely separated from the Lokāyata 
system. Nyāya and Vaiśeᒲika constitute the secular phi-
losophies of lay scholars of nontheological paᒤᒅitas and 
of ‘heretics’”. (3:558).
A. K. Warder, on the other hand, is of the opinion that 
religion and philosophy could be separated in the Indian 
tradition. Following this idea, he proposed to study the 
major philosophical systems without any reference to 
religion. He takes his stand on the basis of a distinction: re-
ligion relies on revelation and admits its authority whereas 
philosophy deals critically with the pursuit of knowledge, 
admitting no absolute authority (Warder, 1971, p. 2).
Philosophies in India: Independent Origins
What needs to be emphasized is that even though some 
philosophical systems in the course of time got tied up 
to some religious sects, philosophy in India had its own 
and independent origin, both secular and rational, quite 
distinct from religion. Some may argue that religion 
came &rst, philosophy later. It may very well be so, but 
the distinction between philosophy and religion is valid 
and can be made at every stage in the Indian context 
too. For example, Nyāya and Vaiśeᒲika in their syncretic 
form declared their adherence to the Veda, and conse-
quently got attached to the Śaiva and the Pāśupata sects 
(Guᒤaratna, Ch. 2, p. 49 and Ch. 5, p. 266). Yet it has 
been argued that such a declaration of faith in the Veda 
was no more than a ruse. S.C. Vidyabhushaᒤa suggested 
so: ‘It seems that the unfavourable criticism to which 
ānvᚹkᒲikᚹ had long been exposed terminated when, under 
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the name of Nyāya-sūtra, it accepted the authority of the 
Vedas’ (S.C. Vidyabhushaᒤa, 1988, p. 39). Debiprasad 
Chattopadhyaya heartily endorsed this view: ‘!e law-
makers demand that the authority of the Vedas must be 
accepted by the philosophers. Goutama and Vātsyāyana 
accept this authority, and thereby save themselves from 
the possibility of being branded as nāstika-s or heretics’ 
(Chattopadhyaya, 1982, pp.lxxxviii-lxxxix). Chattopad-
hyaya further observed: ‘At the same time they (sc. !e 
Nyāya philosophers) leave enough hints that this sub-
mission to scriptural authority is of the nature of ransom 
paid to the authorities for the purpose of saving ānvīkᒲikī’ 
(ibid. p.lxxxix). Elsewhere too he calls it: loyalty to the 
counter-ideology pledged under duress (2014, p. 316). 
!eir religious beliefs – insofar as they were genuine – did 
not a]ect the contents of these two philosophical systems. 
It can be demonstrated that the fundamentals of the pro-
Vedic philosophical systems owe nothing to the Vedas or 
the ancillary literature related to them. Mīmāᒢsā and 
Vedānta too, despite their unmistakable links to the Vedic 
and the Upaniᒲadic traditions respectively (hence called 
Pūrva-mīmāᒢsā and Uttara-mᚹmāᒢsā, the earlier and the 
later Mīmāᒢsās), developed their own logical tools and 
reached their conclusions in the same way as Sāᒢkhya, 
Nyāya and Vaiśeᒲika did.
Turning to the non-Vedic (or rather anti-Vedic) sys-
tems, we have to note that Buddhism and Jainism did have 
their origins in two godless religions. Yet they joined ‘the 
battle of the books’, the philosophical debates between 
several Vedic and non-Vedic systems, that continued from 
the eighth century ce to the twelfth century ce. When 
the Buddhist and the Jain philosophers did so, they left all 
their religious trappings behind and got into the fray with 
unlimited gusto, not only to defend their own systems, 
both religious and philosophical, but also to demolish their 
opponents. !eir opponents included both materialists 
(the Cārvāka/Lokāyata in particular) and systems of other 
hues, mostly Nyāya and Vedānta.
Vedic and Non-Vedic Philosophical Systems
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the division bet-
ween the Vedic and non-Vedic philosophical systems has 
been regarded as something fundamental in the history of 
philosophy in India, although Western scholars have not 
paid enough attention to this division. (Wilhelm Halbfass 
has dealt with the questions of darśanas and ānvīkᒲikī 
vis-à-vis philosophy in 1988 pp. 263-286, but has not 
considred the āstika-nāstika division as basic).
In Sanskrit philosophical literature the word nāstika 
(lit. negativitist, meaning any denier, dissenter, etc.) is 
often found used in two senses, one broad and the other, 
narrow. In the broadest sense, nāstika refers to the Budd-
hists, the Jains, and the materialists or quasi-materialists of 
all hues, as well as all heretical and heterodox doctrines that 
do not adhere to the Vedic religious practice of o]ering 
sacri&ce to the gods (yajña). !e earliest reference to the 
existence of such nāstikas is documented in the Maitrī 
Upaniᒲad (MaiUp) 7.8 (See below).
In the narrow sense, however, nāstika signi&es the 
materialist alone. But the term is applied to suggest two 
di]erent but not altogether unrelated characteristics. In 
the &rst instance, a nāstika is ‘a de&ler of the Veda,’ veda-
nindaka (as Manu 2.11 says); in the second, it indicates 
exclusively a denier of the Other World (paraloka). In this 
narrow sense the Buddhists and the Jains are obviously 
excluded, since they are as much believers in heaven and 
hell as the Vedists, al ther heaens and hells are located 
elsewhere, not exactly wher the brahamanical abodes of 
the dead are. It is in this sense that the Buddhists and the 
Jains too speak of the materialists as nāstika.
!e term āstika-vādin is &rst found most probably 
in Haribhadra (eighth century CE)’s ᐀aᒅ-darśana-
samuccaya (᐀Sam), Ch. 6, verse 78 (pañcaiva āstika-
vādinaᒒ, the &ve are a$rmativists). !is obviously presup-
poses its antonym nāstika-vādin. Śaᒣkara (ninth century 
CE) speaks of astitva-vādinaᒒ (those who say (it) exists) 
and nāstikavādin (he who says (it) does not exist) in his 
gloss on Kaᒷha Upaniᒲad (KUp) 2.3.12. Madhusūdana 
Sarasvatī (seventeenth century CE), in his Prasthānabheda, 
p.1, &rst identi&es the following six – the four Buddhist 
systems, namely, Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntrika, 
and Vaibhāᒲika, then Jainism and &nally the Lokāyata – 
as ‘six [negativist] philosophies’ (ᒲaᒅ [nāstika] darśanāni). 
Cimanabhaᒷᒷa repeats it (1923, pp. 89-90), emphasizing 
their anti-Vedic character. (See also Radhakanta Deva’s 
Sanskrit lexicon, the Śabda-kalpa-druma, s.v. nāstika. !e 
so-called ‘six [Indian] systems of philosophy,’ however, 
refer to the a$rmativist systems only. For details see F. 
Max Müller (1899/1971).
Authors right from KamalaśÄla (eighth century) down 
to Hemacandra (twelfth century) and Sāyaᒤa-Mādhava 
(fourteenth century) follow this practice. A nāstika then 
is to be understood either as a follower of the non-Vedic 
path (but not necessarily a materialist) or as a professed 
naturalist or physicalist (the two innocuous names that 
are used euphemistically to mean materialism) or both.
In the ancient Indian context, a materialist is &rst 
known by his denial of the Other World (heaven and 
hell) and consequently, of, what is quintessentially Indian, 
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rebirth. Later, he is described as a denier of the authority 
of the Vedas. !e materialists denied both the existence of 
the Other World and the supreme authority of the Veda, 
while the Buddhists and the Jains di]ered from the ma-
terialist in accepting the &rst, but were at one with them 
in denying the second. !ere had also been hundreds of 
minor religious congregations formed around one or the 
other guru belonging more often than not to a so-called 
lower caste. !ese folk cults are vehemently anti-Veda 
and anti-Brahmana. !ey comprise the so-called Little 
Tradition in Bengal (present-day West Bengal in India 
and Bangladesh) and the rest of eastern India. S. Dasgupta 
called them as ‘obscure religious cults’. !ey too are as 
much opposed to the Vedic religious practices as the 
Buddhists and the Jains are. !ey are still there in all parts 
of the sub-continent as they were in Upaniᒲadic India. 
!e Maitrī Upaniᒲad (MaiUp) 7.8 describes in graphic 
details such communities as are marked by (a) anti-Vedic 
attitude and (b) śūdra (“low-caste”) associations. !e 
passage runs as follows:
Now follow the impediments to the attainment of knowled-
ge, O King! !is is verily the source of the net of infatuation, 
– that he who is &t for heaven has intercourse with those 
who are not &t for heaven; this is the source. Even though 
a tree with wide-spreading branches is pointed out before 
them, they take up with the mean bush. !ose too, besides, 
who are for ever (sic) lured by pleasure, for ever (sic) sent 
on another’s errands, for ever (sic) begging, for ever (sic) 
living by mechanical trades, – and those too who beg in 
cities, who perform sacri&ces for those who should not o]er 
them, the disciples of Śūdras, and Śūdras who read the sacred 
books; and those two who are knaves, who wear matted 
hair, dancers, soldiers, religious mendicants, actors, those 
employed in kings’ business, outcasts, &c.; and also those 
who worshipping wealth pretend to propitiate the yakshas, 
rakshasas, goblins, the gaᒤas, piśāchas, snakes, imps &c.; 
also those who under false pretexts wear red garments and 
earrings and skulls; and also those who oppose the followers 
of the Veda by false arguments and examples, deceptions 
and magic, – with all these let him not associate. !ey are 
all open thieves and un&t for heaven. !us saith (the Śruti); 
!e world, bewildered by juggling denials of the soul, and by 
false examples and reasons, knows not what is the di]erence 
between the Veda and (pretended) science. (E.B. Cowell’s 
translation, 1935, pp. 287-288. For another translation (and 
notes) see Van Buitenen, 1962, pp. 88, 153).
It is no wonder then that the term a-vaidika (non-
Vedic) is used in this Upaniᒲad precisely in this context 
(7.8). Interestingly enough, this term occurs only once in 
the whole corpus of the eighteen principal Upaniᒲads, 
and that too in the MaiUp alone. !ere is another loaded 
word, nāstikya, in this very Upaniᒲad (3.5). !is word too 
is unique in the Upaniᒲadic literature. However, there 
is no evidence that these heterodox congregations were 
materialists, although they shared both the anti-Vedic 
and anti-brahmanical stance of the materialists (cf. Ajita 
Kesakambala’s exposition of the basic materialist doc-
trine in the ‘Discourse on the Fruits of Being a Monk’ 
(‘Sāmañña-phala-sutta’) in the Long Discourses (Dīgha-
nikāya) ). Apparently, they adhered to some forms of 
meditation and worship, quite unlike the Vedic rituals.
Here I must di]er from the view advocated by Dr 
Saktinatha Jha, who has specialized in the study of Bauls 
and Fakirs in Bengal. He describes the Bāuls as vastuvādin 
(materialist) by positing several points of similarity 
between the Cārvāka/Lokāyata and the Bāul doctrines 
by quoting extensively from the literature of both (Jha, 
1999, pp. 440-489). In their epistemology they insisted 
on direct perception (pratyakᒲa) and oppose the Veda. 
However, the basic points he misses are that, all said and 
done, the Bāuls follow a system of meditation (sādhana-
paddhati); they as well as all members of similar congre-
gations form a community of worshippers (sādhakas), 
who aspire after something extramundane. Second, there 
is a strong streak of allegiance to the guru (gurubhakti) 
which is the hall mark of all such popular congregations, 
not just the Bāuls. !is kind of guru cult is totally alien 
to the materialist tradition in India or anywhere else in 
the world. Other than perception and inference based on 
perception, no materialist worth his salt would consider 
the guru as omniscient (cf. Purandara’s statement quoted 
in Tattva-saᒣgraha-pañjikā, on Tattva-saᒣgraha, ch. 18, 
verse 1481, p. 528: ‘!e Cārvākas, too, admit of such an 
inference as is well-known in the world, but that which is 
called inference [by some], transgressing the worldly way, 
is prohibited [by them].’). !ird, the songs and hymns of 
the Bauls belong basically to the oral tradition; all of them 
are composed in local vernaculars (dialects, to be more 
exact) whereas the Cārvāka/Lokāyata or the materialist 
tradition adopted Sanskrit as their vehicle, at least from the 
early centuries of the Common Era. One may argue that 
both of them drew from a single popular tradition. Quite 
probable, but it should not be overlooked that the two at 
some point of time bifurcated into two distinct traditions: 
one connected with a system of meditation and worship, 
anti-Vedic to be sure, but essentially religious. !e other 
developed into a proper philosophical system with its own 
base (mūla) text, that is, a book of aphorisms (sūtras) and 
its commentaries. !ey had no track with either the Vedic 
or the Purāᒤic gods and goddesses, which the Bāuls never 
got rid of, even if it involved the guru alone. In short, the 
popular anti-Vedic cults, despite their anti-caste stand, 
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remained at the bottom theistic and would be grouped 
under the āstikas, whereas the materialists right from 
their inception were branded by the Brahmanical, Jain 
and Buddhist opponents as nāstikas.
The astika and the nastika
Modern scholars seem to pay little or no attention to 
the basic distinction between the āstika (brahmanical) 
systems of philosophy and the six other nāstika schools, 
the so-called ᒲaᒅdarśanāni (six systems) on both sides. 
!ere are Sāᒢkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśe Mīmāᒢsā and 
Vedanta on the āstika side; Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, 
Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika (four Buddhist schools), the 
Jain (anekāntavāda/syādvāda), and materialism on the 
nāstika side. !e list of these twelve systems, neatly divided 
into two sets of six each, is probably &rst found in the 
Prasthānabheda by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (see above). 
Another such list of six systems based on adherence to 
reasoning (tarka) is found in earlier works. It is known as ᒲaᒷ-tarkᚹ. !e list of such six systems, however, is never 
uniform (For a detailed study, see Gerschheimer, 2001, 
pp. 173-189; 2007, pp. 239-258). It can be demonstrated 
that the contradiction between the āstika and the nāstika 
systems of philosophy is, at bottom, religious; philoso-
phical questions come later. It is the anti-Vedic nature of 
the nāstika schools that is at the root of all antagonism.
In relation to materialism, however, there is another 
point of controversy. Materialism is targeted by all brah-
manical and two chief non-brahmanical schools, the 
Jains and the Buddhists, because of its non-adherence to 
another religious dogma shared by the Vedists and the two 
non-Vedic schools alike. !at is the belief in the existence 
of the Other World. !e hostility is more religious than 
philosophical. Jayantabhaᒷᒷa (ninth century) controverts 
materialism mostly on epistemological grounds, but notes 
that the denial of the Other World is the chief point to 
be refuted. He thinks that, if the existence of the Other 
World could be established, the materialists could then 
be made to admit God as well (see Chattopadhyaya and 
Gangopadhyaya, 1990, p.156). !e existence of the Other 
World can be taken as a philosophical issue as much as the 
question of the First Cause (in Sanskrit, jagatkāraᒤa, lit. 
the cause of the world). But acceptance of the existence 
of the Other World involves a set of rituals, particularly 
the annual rite for the ancestors (srāddha), which was the 
target of attack of all the three main non-Vedic philoso-
phical communities (See R. Bhattacharya 2013c).
The Other World and karman
!e &rst question to ask is: What has the Vedas got 
to do with philosophy? Even if the Vedas, mainly the ᏼg 
and the Yajuᒒ, contain philosophy, that is a philosophy 
of sacri&ce and the gods, in other words, a religious dog-
ma.  
Haribhadra and Śāntarakᒲita in their doxographical 
works, however, show little concern with the issue of the 
denial of the Other World. To them materialism is to be 
combatted purely on epistemological and ontological 
grounds, without any reference to religious beliefs, inclu-
ding the belief or non-belief in the Other World.
When and how the doctrine of karman became a part 
of all the philosophical schools (again, except materialism), 
irrespective of their religious a$liations, is to be probed 
in greater details (see Halbfass 1992, pp. 292-293). !e 
basic di]erence between the materialist systems on the 
one hand and all idealist and &deist systems on the other, 
hinges on this issue – acceptance or rejection of the doc-
trine of karman – although written records do not seem 
to highlight this point. Halbfass has pointed out:
In contrast with its absence in the Vedic hymns and with 
its still controversial and somewhat tentative status in the 
most ancient Upaniᒲads, the doctrine of karma and saᒢsāra 
seems to be fully established and almost universally accepted 
as a comprehensive world-view in classical and later Indian 
thought. Only the Cārvākas and other “materialists” appear as 
rigorous critiques of its basic premises . . . (1992, pp. 292-293. 
Emphasis added).
!e objection raised by the pro-Vedic schools against 
the non- or anti-Vedic ones, however, was more religious 
than philosophical. Once the issue of adherence to the 
Veda has been grafted to philosophy, the feud assumed a 
religious character. Śaᒣkara’s denunciation of Mīmāᒢsā 
is not of the same nature as that of Sāᒣkhya and Vaiśesika 
(see his comments on the Brahmasūtra 2.1.3, 2.2.1 and 
2.2.11). !e one objection he uses almost as a mace is 
their alleged non-Vedic character, in spite of their open 
declaration of total adherence to the Veda (see his com-
ments on the Brahmasūtra 2.2.17-18). Śañkara’s choice 
of words is always remarkable. If the opponent is not to 
be dismissed as non-Vedic because of their pronounced 
faith in the Veda, he calls them “semi-nihilistic,” ardha-
vaināśika (as in his comments on 2.2.18), meaning half-
Buddhistic. Śaᒣkara’s orthodoxy is not so much philoso-
phical as religious, for what has the Veda got to do with 
philosophy, or with what in India is traditionally known 
as daräana? Right from the time of the MaiUp, admit-
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tedly a late Upaniᒲad and de&nitely post-Buddhist, the 
word non-Vedic, a-vaidika (7.10) came to be recognized 
as a term of censure, if not of abuse. Another such word 
in the same Upaniᒲad is negativism, nāstikya (3.5). !e 
import is equally objectionable to orthodoxy. Nāstikya, 
however, concerns denial of the Other World, a term that 
most probably originated from the KUp 1.1.20. Naciketas 
there asks Yama:
!is doubt that [there is] in regard to a man that is departed 
– “he is,” say some; and “this one is not,” say some – this I 
would fain know, instructed by thee. . . . (D.W. Whitney’s 
translation)
yeyam prete vicikitsā manuᒲye ’stīty eke nāyam astīti caike |
 etat vidyām anuśiᒲᒷas tvayāham. . . . ||
(Cf. also ‘!is [is] the world; there is no other,’ ayaᒢ 
loko nāsti para iti. KUp, 1.2.6c. Franco has called it, dou-
btless inadvertently, ‘a Cārvāka saying’ (1997, p.112 n35). 
It actually occurs in the KUp, spoken by Yama himself.).
!e antagonism between faith/credo and doubt that 
is apparent in this Upaniᒲad, however, has nothing to 
do with the Veda. Nor does Yama, the lord of the dead, 
denounce even once the nāstikas as anti-Vedic. What 
he is made to do is to pronounce, or to assert without 
any evidence based either on perception (pratyakᒲa) or 
inference (anumāna), or even learning the sacred books 
(śāstra): na medhayā na bahunā śrutena, 1.2.26b. It is only 
the assertion of Yama, who is called Death (Mᒮtyu) in this 
Upaniᒲad (1.1.11, 3.15-16) that is to be believed and 
accepted, as if his is the last word on this issue. It is the 
authoritative nature (āptatva) of Yama that is projected 
as the only source of knowing that there is such a world 
beyond this perceptible world called the Other World. 
!us āpti, authoritativeness of a person who is most 
knowledgeable in this area, is the only instrument of 
cognition (pramāᒤa) so far as the existence of the Other 
World is concerned.
All this is relevant to our study, for the two issues 
that brought forth several rival approaches are related to 
purely philosophical questions, namely, the origin of the 
world and the existence of the Other World. !e &rst is 
mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara Upanisad (1.2) and the 
second in the KUp (1.1.2). !ere was another issue that 
troubled the thinkers both in the West and India: what 
came &rst, matter or consciousness. Yājñavalkya in the 
Bᒮhadāraᒤyaka Upanisad and Uddālaka Āruᒤi in the 
Chāndogya Upanisad are engaged in discourses related to 
this issue. !is is why Yājñavalkya has rightly been desig-
nated as the founder of Idealism and Uddālaka Āruᒤi as 
the founder of materialism in India (See Ruben 1962, 
pp.345-354, followed by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya 
1985, pp.196-227).
!e existence of the Other World can be called a 
matter of both philosophical and religious quest, since it 
involves the question of heaven and hell, of reward and 
punishment for meritorious and unmeritorious acts of 
humans, in one word, karman. What might have begun as 
a matter of natural curiosity regarding what or if anything 
happens after death ultimately turned out to be a matter 
of vital importance in relation to religious beliefs. !e 
doctrine of karman added its weight to the concept of 
retribution without however any resort to God or any such 
supernatural agency. !e doctrine might have originated 
with Buddhism, a religion without any god. !e o$ce 
of karman is basically autonomous: even in Hinduism, 
karman has its own ‘as you sow, so you reap’ kind of 
arrangement. In any case, nāstikya is basically a religious 
concept, essentially connected with the Other World and 
later with the Veda. Only much later, unfortunately we 
do not know from when, nāstikya was grafted to philo-
sophy. Right from Śaᒣkara āstikya becomes the yardstick 
for judging the orthodoxy of any philosophical system. 
In his commentary on the KUp Śaᒣkara uses the words 
āstikya and nāstikya to distinguish between those who are 
to be counted as sheep and those as wolves (gloss on KUp 
2.3.12). Śaᒣkara employs the terms, astitva-vādinaᒒ and 
nāstikavādin (see n9 above). !e former believes in the 
existence of the extra-corporal spirit whereas the latter does 
not. As we have shown before, Śaᒣkara spares none – not 
only the traditional nāstikas like the Buddhists, the Jains, 
and the materialists (whom he generally describes as the 
Lokāyatikas) but also the so called āstika systems. Sāᒢkhya 
is his main opponent, and by referring to the pradhāna 
malla-nirvahaᒤa-nyāya (like defeating the chief wrestler) 
he makes it clear that there were others, professedly pro-
Vedic systems that he considers equally worth refuting.
Āstikya and nāstikya in the Gītā and the Religious 
Law-books
It may also be mentioned in this connection that the 
word, āstikya, is found in the Gītā as well. Kᒮᒲᒤa tells 
Arjuna:
Internal and external self-control, purity, forgiveness, recti-
tude, learning, spiritual perception, and faith (āstikya) are 
the nature-born duties of Brahmans. (18.42. Mohini M. 
Chatterji’s translation.)
The context is definitely religio-philosophical: 
Sāᒢkhya here turns into Sāᒢkhya-Yoga and Yoga itself 
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becomes the second term for several other compounds 
(all the 18 chapters in the Gītā have names ending with 
-yoga). Kapila, the legendary founder of the Sāᒢkhya 
system, is not rejected. On the other hand, Kᒮᒲᒤa himself 
reveals his identity as Kapila among the Siddhas (10.26). 
In the religious law-books, the Dharmaśāstras, nāstikya 
is treated invariably as a sin, nominally a minor sin (upa-
pātaka) but in many cases it is on a par with such great 
sins (mahā-pātakas) as stealing the gold of a brahmana, 
steya (See Moghe, 2000, p.444-448; for further details see 
Kane, 1973, 4: 13-16).
!is is how religis texts like the Gītā and theDharmaśāstra 
intrude into darśana; dissidence is considered to be a hei-
nous sin as in social and religious life so in philosophy. !e 
whole course of events cannot be traced with certainty; 
there are many missing links and wide gaps in infor-
mation. But the broad outline of the course of darśana 
evinces two sharply distinguishable phases. First, a totally 
secular stage when enquiries regarding the origin of the 
world, relative priority of matter and consciousness, and 
what happens after the death of humans are raised, and 
the second stage when the concept of āstikya and nāstikya 
permeates the scenario, changing thereby the secular 
nature of darśana itself.  
Coda
!e upshot of the whole discussion then is that the 
darśanas in India had their origin in philosophical quest, 
quite distinct from religion. But in the course of time, 
all but the materialist systems (Lokāyata, bhūtavāda, the 
Cārvāka, etc.) turned out to be philosophico-religious 
ones. On the contrary, the Pre-Cārvāka and the Cārvāka 
systems remained purely philosophical, free from any 
religious belief or adherence to any religious community 
or text such as the Veda. !ere were di]erences between 
the materialist schools regarding epistemological and some 
other questions as well, but they were the only a-religious 
systems of philosophy known to us. It is possible that 
originally Sāᒢkhya and Vaiśeᒲika were free from religious 
associations, but the fact is that the syncretic Sāᒢkhya-
Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeᒲika became theistic, closely related 
to two religious communities. Guᒤaratna’s description of 
the seven philosophical schools seeks to attach a religious 
community to the philosophical systems he deals with, 
all in a one-to-one correspondence. How far he is stating 
facts and how far he is inventing such connections is open 
to question. What, however, can be de&nitely challenged 
is the connection he proposes to establish between the 
Cārvāka/Lokāyata and the Kāpālika doctrine, which is 
totally absurd. So far as the Kāpālikas are concerned, they 
were known to have no philosophy of their own. It was 
a religious community living at the fringe of the Hindu 
society. !eir existence as a sect is recorded from the 
ninth century CE (Vācaspatimiśra on the Brahmasūtra). 
Even before him, Bhavabhūti in his play, Mālatī-mādhava 
(eighth century) mentions one such Kāpālika (it was 
from this play that Bankimacandra Chattopadhyaya 
(1834-1894) drew the name of the heroine of his novel, 
Kapālakuᒤᒅalā (the novel, which came out in 1866, too 
bears the same title). !ere is an evil Kāpālika in this novel 
as well). As S.N. Dasgupta states, ‘[W]e have no proof 
that the Kāpālikas and the Kālamukhas had any distinct 
philosophical views which could be treated separately’ 
(5:3). He further says, ‘[W]e know practically nothing of 
any importance about the Kāpālikas and the Kālamukhas’ 
(5:5). He reiterates this view on other occasions too (5:50). 
!ere were hundreds of religious communities claiming 
adherence to the mother goddess, Śakti, but they had no 
philosophy worth the name; they di]ered only in the 
details of rituals (including the identifying marks to be 
painted on their foreheads). Guᒤaratna’s facile identi&-
cation of each and every of the seven systems cannot be 
relied upon. More particularly his identi&cation of the 
Cārvāka/Lokāyatas with the Kāpālikas is, in all probability, 
a &gment of his fancy.
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